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I. INTRODUCTION

Professional responsibility law in Florida continued to expand in
1997.1 Case law, rules, 2 and ethics opinions amplified and, in some areas,
extended the duties that lawyers assume as officers of the judicial branch of
government. This article examines professional responsibility decisions that
are likely to affect the relationships that lawyers have with clients, former
clients, judges, third parties, and The Florida Bar.3
Part II looks at developments affecting the most important relationship
that lawyers establish and operate within: the relationship between lawyer
and client. Part III reviews developments of significance to the lawyer's
relationship to the court and the judicial system. Part IV examines
decisions that could impact the lawyer's relationship with third parties,
* Director, Library and Technology Center and Assistant Professor of Law, Florida
Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida State University; J.D.,
1984, University of Texas at Austin; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Kelly J. Wright.
** Florida Bar Ethics Director, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of Florida;
J.D., 1990, University of Florida.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1996, through July 14, 1997.
2. Of primary interest here are changes to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
("RPC"), which comprise Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
3. Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection, rather than in every section to which they might possibly relate.
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such as opposing parties, other attorneys, expert witnesses, potential clients,
employers, and creditors. Part V explores the lawyer's relationship with The
Florida Bar and other disciplinary authorities and reviews a number of4
disciplinary actions taken against Florida lawyers for widely varying conduct.
II. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS
For most lawyers, the attorney-client relationship is the professional
relationship that commands the majority of their attention and effort. Ethical
issues can arise at any point in the attorney-client relationship, from the initial
consultation through termination of the matter. Recent decisions have
addressed questions of establishing an attorney-client relationship,
conflicts of interest, confidentiality, communication, fees, fiduciary
duties, competent representation, diligence, and withdrawal.
In Goldfarb v. Daitch,5 the Third District Court of Appeal reaffimned the
basic concepts that the attorney-client relationship is a consensual one, and
that an attorney cannot act on behalf of someone unless the attorney has been
properly authorized to do so. 6 Daitch was the defendant in a mortgage
foreclosure suit.7 A final judgment of foreclosure was entered, and the
property was sold at a clerk's sale. On the day that the certificate of sale was
issued, attorney Goldfarb filed a motion seeking disbursement of surplus
funds that were held in the court's registry. Pursuant to the court's order,
funds were disbursed to various parties, including to "'Goldfarb, as attorney
for Marilyn Daitch."' 8
A few weeks later Daitch, through another lawyer, filed an emergency
motion to vacate the disbursement order. Daitch alleged that she had never
met Goldfarb, and that Goldfarb had no authority to represent her in the
foreclosure matter. At the hearing on the motion, Daitch testified that she was
unrepresented in the foreclosure case; indeed, a default had been entered
against her. After the sale, Daitch was approached at her home by two men
who claimed to have purchased the house at the sale and needed to talk to her
about the sale. Intimidated, Daitch signed a blank document and the men left.
Two nights later the men returned with a check for the "'surplus funds less
1/3 fee for collection."' 9 Daitch claimed that she first learned of Goldfarb's

4. Important disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate throughout the article,
but most are collected in part V for the convenience of the reader.
5. 696 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
6. Id. at 1199.
7. Id. at 1200.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1201.
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involvement when she signed a receipt for the check. The receipt reflected a
$2000 legal fee.10
Testimony of Daitch and others showed that the document Daitch had
signed was a power of attorney giving two individuals authority to employ an
attorney to represent her in the foreclosure and authority to deduct, "'as a nonrefundable option"' one-third of any funds due Daitch." Goldfarb testified
that he had not met Daitch at the time he was allegedly retained, but filed the
motion for the surplus funds based on the document alone. Although
Goldfarb did not know Daitch, he did know the individuals12who held the
power of attorney, having represented them on prior occasions.
The trial judge vacated the disbursement order, finding that Goldfarb had
no authority to represent Daitch and that "'there existed no valid
attorney/client relationship by and between' Goldfarb and Daitch."' 3 The
court's order is not remarkable. It simply reflects that the attorney-client
relationship is grounded in agency principles, one of the most fundamental of
which is that an agent can act only when properly authorized by the principal.
Unfortunately, this basic
14 point of law is sometimes ignored or misunderstood
by practicing lawyers.
Goldfarb is noteworthy for another reason. Both the trial court and the
Third District Court of Appeal expressed concern about a conflict of interest
on attorney Goldfarb's part. 15 The appellate court noted that Goldfarb
effectively acknowledged the existence of "a patent conflict of interest" when
he replied, after being questioned by the trial judge about a possible conflict
of interest, that'16"'I don't see anything wrong in representing investors in these
type of deals."
Business transactions in which a lawyer is a party often result in conflict
of interest problems, especially transactions that involve the lawyer's client.
The obvious potential for conflict is recognized in RPC 4-1.8(a), 7 which

10. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1201.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1202.
13. Id. at 1203.
14. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Giant, 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1086 (1995); Florida Bar v. Jasperson, 625 So. 2d 459 (Fla.1993); Smith v. Perry, 635 So. 2d
1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
15. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1199.
16. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added by appellate court) (quoting the Plaintiff, Goldfarb).
17. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
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regulates these types of transactions as an ethical matter. In Florida Bar v.
Laing,18 the lawyer stepped into a client's business deal that had gone bad and
turned it to his own advantage. 19 In imposing a ninety-one day suspension for
this and other violations, 20 the Supreme Court of Florida noted that entering
into a business transaction with21his client required the lawyer to comply with
the provisions of RPC 4-1.8(a).
A lawyer who represents multiple parties in business matters also must
be alert to conflict of interest concerns. Such representation is not strictly
prohibited,2 2 but a lawyer who undertakes to represent parties whose interests
appear to be aligned at the outset, takes the risk that those interests could
diverge at some point during the deal. If that happens, the lawyer usually will

adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
RPC 4-1.8(a).
18. 695 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1997).
19. Id. at 301.
20. Id. at 304.
21. See supra note 17.
22. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; GENERAL
RULE," provide:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
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be ethically obligated to withdraw from the entire matter.23 A lawyer who
failed to recognize the warning signs of a serious conflict ended up with
disciplinary problems in FloridaBar v. Joy.24 The lawyer represented three
individuals, including a father and son, who were shareholders in a
corporation that invested in real estate. When an apartment building owned
by the corporation burned, the insurer suspected arson and refused to pay the
claim. The corporation retained the lawyer to pursue its claim for insurance
proceeds. Sometime during this course of events, however, the lawyer began
to distrust the father and son and secretly started providing the third
shareholder with blind copies of his correspondence with the father and son.
To make matters worse, the lawyer attempted to protect the third
shareholder's interest by obtaining an assignment of his shares in the
corporation. This was done without the knowledge of either the father or son.
A substantial settlement was reached with the insurer, but the situation
deteriorated further when the lawyer removed some of the settlement proceeds
from this trust account without authorization and deposited them into an
account bearing his wife's name. The final chapter in this sad saga was a
physical altercation between the lawyer and the son.25 This conflict-ridden
conduct netted the lawyer a ninety-one day suspension.
In contrast, a lawyer was held to be not guilty of conflict violations in
Florida Bar v. Norvell.26 The lawyer had served a disciplinary suspension
and had been readmitted to practice. Prior to his readmission, the lawyer was
involved with a builder in the builder's suit against a construction corporation.
The lawyer then attempted to represent the corporation in its bankruptcy
proceeding, misrepresenting to the bankruptcy court that he was a
"'disinterested person."' 27 The bankruptcy judge, however, declined to allow
RPC 4-1.7(a)-(b).
23. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; FORMER
CLIENT," provide:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
24. 679 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1996).
25. Id. at 1168.
26. 685 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1996).
27. Id. at 1297.
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the lawyer into the case.28 The lawyer next entered into an agreement to
acquire ownership of the corporation and, after doing so, reapplied to
represent the corporation in the bankruptcy case. Unlike the prior application,
however, at this time the lawyer did disclose to the court his prospective
ownership interest in the debtor corporation. Despite this series of events, the
lawyer was found not to have violated the conflict of interest rules,
specifically RPC 4-1.7(b). 29 The Supreme Court of Florida 3noted
that most of
0
the conflict-related information was known to all principals.
Sometimes conflicts are apparent at the inception of a representation, as
was the case in Goldfarb.31 Often, however, an actual or potential conflict
problem arises during a representation. Decisions concerning both types of
conflicts in the criminal defense context were handed down in the past
year. Regarding conflict issues to be confronted at the beginning of a matter
The Florida Bar Board of Governors published Florida Ethics Opinion 96-231
to address an issue that had not been reviewed in a formal ethics opinion since
1978: the extent, if any, to which a law firm that represents local law
enforcement agencies may engage in criminal defense work in that same
county.33

Overruling portions of prior opinions, Opinion 96-2 concluded that a
law firm that represents local law enforcement agencies on civil and
administrative matters is not per se precluded from engaging in criminal
defense work within the same county.3 5 Instead, whether such dual
representation is ethically permissible depends on application of the conflict
rules, particularly RPC 4-1.7(b), 36 to the specific facts and circumstances
involved. The opinion spoke to several general scenarios. First, it noted that
where the firm's law enforcement clients are completely uninvolved in a
criminal matter, no potential conflict of interest exists and the firm may
defend the accused without triggering the conflict provisions of the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct. 37 Second, if the firm's law enforcement clients are in
some way involved in a criminal matter, the firm may represent the accused

28. Id.
29. See supra note 22.
30. Norvell, 685 So. 2d at 1298.
31. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1199; see also supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
32. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-2 (1996).
33. Id.
34. Opinion 96-2 states that Florida Ethics Opinions 74-37, 74-37 (Reconsideration),
and 78-8 were "overly broad" and overruled those opinions "to the extent that they conflict
with" the conclusions reached in Opinion 96-2. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
37. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-2 (1996).
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only if it complies with the provisions of RPC 4-1.7(b), including obtaining
the informed consent of both clients.38 Third, where a law enforcement client
of the firm is involved in a criminal matter "in a direct and material way," 39
the
firm is ethically precluded from representing the criminal defendant.
Significantly, the opinion recognizes that attacking an employee of a client
agency on cross-examination
presents an unwaivable conflict of interest in
40
context.
this
Both the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal addressed conflicts,
or alleged conflicts, that arose or became apparent after a representation had
commenced. In Rodriguez v. State,41 the defendant's trial counsel was a
former assistant state attorney.42 While with the State Attorney's Office years
before, counsel had substituted for the assigned prosecutor at a hearing in a
previous and totally unrelated case against the defendant. Counsel did not
even remember this prior matter until, just before sentencing in the present
case, he was shown certified copies of the defendant's prior tconvictions.
3
Under these facts, the court stated curtly that "no conflict exists.'
Two Fourth District Court of Appeal cases dealt with the not uncommon
situation of a criminal defendant who becomes dissatisfied with appointed
counsel during the case and then moves to discharge that counsel. In
Cunningham v. State,44 defendant Cunningham had pled guilty to certain
charges.45 After the plea hearing but before sentencing, he filed an unsworn
motion to vacate his plea and to have new counsel appointed, citing alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion following
a hearing at which the court inquired into the basis of Cunningham's motion
to discharge his current counsel.46 Affirming the trial court's order, the
appellate court distinguished another recent decision in this area, Roberts v.
State.47 Unlike the situation in Roberts, defendant Cunningham made no
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.

92-367 (1992).
41. 684 So. 2d 833 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
42. Id. at 833.
43. Id. See also McCaskill v. State, 638 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(claim of ineffective assistance properly denied where the defense attorney had been a state
attorney who signed original information against defendant). In the instant case, defendant
knowingly sought out and retained an attorney, and defendant was prosecuted based on
amended information with which the attorney had no active involvement.
44. 677 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
45. Id. at 930.
46. Id.
47. Id. (referring to Roberts v. State, 670 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
The Roberts court found that an actual conflict of interest was present because the very basis
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specific allegations concerning his counsel's performance and counsel did not
move to withdraw from the case. In fact, the court stated, "nor would we
expect such a motion to be routinely filed under these facts. ' ,s Recognizing
that Roberts turned on its particular facts,49 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal stated that "Roberts should not be read to establish a per se rule
requiring a trial court to appoint new counsel to argue a motion to withdraw a
plea upon the mere filing of a motion to discharge trial counsel."50
Cunningham is notable because the court "[p]arenthetically" outlined what it
termed a "preferable way" to handle a motion to discharge counsel and vacate
plea based on complaints about counsel's performance.51 Providing advice
that should be helpful to trial courts as well as practicing attorneys, the court
suggested:
The motion to discharge should be addressed first and if, following
a Nelson inquiry, the motion is denied as insufficient, the defendant
could then be given the option of either proceeding with current
counsel, hiring his or her own lawyer, or representing himself or
herself on the motion to vacate the plea.52
In a contrasting case, Hope v. State,53 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
relied upon Roberts in holding that a criminal defendant was denied effective
54
assistance of counsel in connection with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
As the court was about to sentence him, Hope orally made a pro se motion to
change his plea to not guilty and to discharge his counsel on the grounds that
counsel had not investigated all of the allegations against him and had not
interviewed all witnesses. Counsel responded by not only defending his
performance but by going much further and offering the trial judge his
for the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was the alleged misconduct of defense
counsel (coercing the defendant to accept the plea offer). Roberts v. State, 670 So. 2d 1042,
1044 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to
withdraw from the representation placed counsel in the untenable position of attempting to
argue the motion to withdraw the plea on the grounds of his own alleged misconduct. Id. at
1045. This conflict between the personal interests of defense counsel and counsel's
obligations to his client was a violation of RPC 4-1.7(b), and thus the trial court erred in not
permitting counsel to withdraw. See Timothy P. Chinaris, ProfessionalResponsibility: 1996
Survey of FloridaLaw, 21 NOVA L. REv. 231, 253-54 (Fall 1996) [hereinafter "Chinaris"].

48.
49.
50.
51.

Cunningham, 677 So. 2d at 930.
Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1042.
Cunningham, 677 So. 2d at 930.
Id. at 931 n.1.

52. Id.

53. 682 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 1174.
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opinion that his client would not prevail at trial. This conflict-ridden scenario
tainted counsel's representation of his client. In reversing and remanding for
appointment of "conflict-free counsel" to argue Hope's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, the appellate court stated that55"[c]learly, this is the type of
adversarial situation contemplated in Roberts."
Confidentiality remains one of the most critical of the duties that is
essential to a proper and effective attorney-client relationship. A law'er's

ethical obligations concerning confidentiality are set forth in RPC 4-1.6. A
significant case concerning both conflict and confidentiality issues was In re
Estate of Montanez57 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order
awarding attorneys' fees to a personal representative, which was a corporation
that had served as guardian for the decedent/ward. The circumstances of the
decedent's death in a nursing home while the corporation was acting as
guardian indicated the possibility of a negligence action against both the

55. Id.
56. Rule 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1)to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to
meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
RPC 4-1.6.
57. 687 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
58. Id. at 944.

224
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nursing home and the guardian corporation. Yet, upon being appointed
personal representative, the corporation, on behalf of the estate, paid the
nursing home's bill and, incredibly, released the nursing home from any
liability for no consideration. The appellate court correctly observed that 59
the
corporation's actions were "fatally tainted by conflicts of interest.,
Regarding the duty of the personal representative's attorney, who apparently
was fully aware of these circumstances, the court stated:
Lawyers are officers of the court and they are responsible to the
judiciary for the propriety of their professional activities. When a
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a client expects
assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or by
the law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the
relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. The attorneys should
have recognized that [the personal representative] could not act
objectively and neutrally in the settlement of the claim, and with
their client's consent advised the court and procured the
appointment of an attorney ad litem to make the investigation and
file its report. Alternatively, under the facts herein, ifthe attorneys
were unable to persuade their client of the certitude of their
advice, then the attorneys should have moved to withdraw on
grounds of irreconcilable differences. Of course, in doing so,
counsel would not reveal the client's secrets or breach their
confidentialrelationship.60
Sometimes lawyers for a fiduciary, such as a personal representative, are
unsure of where their loyalties lie. Florida law holds that a lawyer for a
personal representative is exactly that, the lawyer for the personal
representative, and not for the estate or the beneficiaries. 61 Montanez
emphasizes this point. 62 The court's statements help clarify the duty of a
personal representative's attorney when the attorney learns of improper
activity on the part of the personal representative.63
A personal
representative's lawyer should treat this type of representation like any other;
this means that the lawyer ordinarily should withdraw if the client/personal
representative appears reasonably likely to engage in improper conduct

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 946.
Id. at 947 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In re Estate of Gory, 570 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
See In re Estate of Montanez, 687 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Gory, 570 So. 2d at 1383.
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despite the lawyer's attempts to dissuade the client. 64 Absent a clear duty of
disclosure under the RPC,6 5 upon withdrawal the lawyer must maintain the
confidentiality of all information relating to the representation. Any duties of

64. Subdivision

(a)

of

RPC

4-1.16,

"DECLINING

OR

TERMINATING

REPRESENTATION," provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law.
RPC 4-1.16.
65. When representing a personal representative situation, the two most likely ways in
which a mandatory duty to disclose confidences could arise are: (1) the personal
representative has made false statements to, or false filings with, the court; or (2) the personal
representative intends to commit a crime or cause substantial bodily harm to someone. RPC
4-1.16(a) (1993). Regarding the former situation, subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-3.3,
"CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL," provide:
(a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fall to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not offer
testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative unless
so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) Extent of Lawyer's Duties. The duties stated in subdivision (a) continue
beyond the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if compliance
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-3.3(a)-(b).
Regarding the latter situation, subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INFORMATION," provides:
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
RPC 4-1.6 (b).
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disclosure are expressly established by 66the RPC and are not enlarged by the
fact that a lawyer represents a fiduciary.
As evidenced by the court's statement in Montanez, the duty of
confidentiality is not always easy to understand and apply.67 In an important
matter of first impression for Florida, as well as nationally, The Florida Bar
Professional Ethics Committee and Board of Governors addressed the duties
of a lawyer who, while representing a married couple in estate planning
matters, was given information by the husband that the husband wished to
keep hidden from the wife. 68 The information in question, of course, would
be of significance to the wife. Florida Ethics Opinion 95-469 carefully
analyzed the ethical obligations that govern the lawyer's conduct. 70 The
opinion recognized the tension between the duty that a lawyer ordinarily has
under RPC 4-1.471 to transmit relevant information to a client and the duty to
keep a client's confidence under RPC 4-1.6. 72 In the situation presented, the
lawyer faced an apparent conflict between the duty to inform the wife of the
relevant information and the duty to honor the confidentiality obligation owed
to the husband. 3
66. Gory, 579 So. 2d at 1383.
67. Montanez, 687 So. 2d at 946. The court addressed the distinction between the
ethical duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. See, e.g.,
Kleinfeld v. State, 568 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 167
(Fla. 1991) (even if exception to ethical confidentiality rule permits or requires attorney to
disclose certain confidential information, this does not affect whether the evidentiary attorneyclient privilege applies to prevent such information from being admitted into evidence);
Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (ethical confidentiality
rule is broader than evidentiary attorney-client privilege, and applies even though the
confidential information in question is discoverable from other sources); Fla. Bar Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 92-5 (1993) (ethical rule of confidentiality prevents attorney from
voluntarily disclosing any information relating to representation, while evidentiary attorneyclient privilege protects certain specified communications from compelled disclosure).
68. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Rule 4-1.4, "COMMUNICATION," provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
RPC 4-1.4 (a)-(b).
72. RPC 4-1.6(b).
73. Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402, 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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Opinion 95-4 properly resolved the dilemma by concluding that the duty
of confidentiality is paramount. 74 The general rule that applies in any client
representation is that all information "relating to the representation" is
confidential as an ethical matter.7 5 There is no basis in the Rules of
Professional Conduct for relaxing this rule when a lawyer jointly represents
multiple clients (such as the husband and wife in the situation addressed in
the opinion).76 Unless it is otherwise understood and agreed in advance by
clients and lawyer, all clients, "including those in a joint representation," have
a right to expect that this general rule of confidentiality will be honored by
their lawyer. 7 No such "no-confidentiality" agreement was made in the joint
representation case that was the subject of the opinion.7 8
The opinion also persuasively rejected the argument that the law of
attorney-client _rivilege should set the ethical standard of attorney-client
confidentiality." Although the information in question might not be protected
by the evidentiary privilege in a future husband-wife suit, 80 that fact was
irrelevant to any consideration of whether the lawyer was permitted or
required, as a matter of professional ethics, to transmit the confidential
information to the non-confiding spouse. 8 1 As is the case when a lawyer
represents two clients in separate matters and learns in confidence information
from one client that would be relevant to the lawyer's representation of the
other client, Opinion 95-4 concluded that the duty of confidentiality was
controlling and required the lawyer to withdraw without disclosing the
confidence to the non-confiding spouse, here the wife. 2
While well reasoned in most respects, the opinion clearly missed the
mark in one important respect. The opinion opened by concluding, with
virtually no discussion or analysis, that the lawyer was under no duty to
discuss potential conflict of interest and confidentiality issues with the
husband and wife at the beginning of the joint representation.8 3 This
conclusion is both incorrect and illogical. Almost every multiple client
representation presents at least a potential for a conflict of interests.

74. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997). The opinion implies that
the lawyer could have, and perhaps should have, prevented the dilemma by discussing the
confidentiality issues with the clients at the outset of the representation.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (1995).
81. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Furthermore, should not the clients be afforded an opportunity to decide
whether they wish to waive the rule of confidentiality that otherwise applies to
their separate disclosures to the lawyer? Without a discussion of the issues at
the outset of the case, the clients are denied the chance to make this decision.
And, of course, the fact that an advisory opinion on this topic was requested
by the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar8 4 and
that the Professional Ethics Committee and the Board of Governors of The
Florida Bar saw the need to publish the opinion, underscores
8 5 the fact that
ethical problems of this type are not uncommon in this setting.
The significance of Opinion 95-4 was highlighted by a Second District
Court of Appeal case, Cone v. Culverhouse.8 6 This case concerned the
applicability of the attorney-client and accountant-client privileges in two
different suits. The scope and extent of the "'common interest"' exceptions to
the privileges were disputed.
In language reminiscent of the situation
addressed in Opinion 95-4, the court stated:
The exceptions to the professional privileges also require that the
matter be one "of common interest."..... [T]he clients' interests
must be sufficiently compatible that a reasonable client would
expect his or her communications concerning the matter to be
accessible to the other client. For example, a married couple
creating an estateplan with interrelateddocuments probably have
no reasonable expectation of confidentiality concerningthe matter
of the joint estate plan, but might still have such expectations
concerning their individual,private discussions with their lawyer
about the reasonsfor including or excluding specific bequests to
thirdpersons in their individual wills.88
The lawyer-client relationship necessarily involves questions of
communication between the parties to that relationship. RPC 4-1.489
requires lawyers to communicate with clients about matters that the lawyer is
handling for them. In FloridaBar v. Glick,90 a lawyer who failed to convey to
his clients the opposing party's settlement offer, and then lied about this to

84. This group is the largest section of the Bar, with more than 7000 members. The
section pursued this matter over a period of years.
85. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
86. 687 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
87. Id. at 891.
88. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
90. 693 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1997).
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The Florida Bar, was suspended from practice for ten days. 9 1 Similarly, a
lawyer's failure to keep a client informed about the status of the case, among
other violations, resulted in a one month suspension in Florida Bar v.
Jordan.92 Not informing the client that the lawyer has let the statute of
limitations lapse is a violation of RPC 4-1.4.93 A lawyer who committed this
violation among others, was suspended for ninety days in Florida Bar v.
Lecznar. 4
Fees are another important aspect of the attorney-client relationship. As
might be expected, fee related issues often are the subject of case law and
ethics opinions. Over the past year, the Professional Ethics Committee
published three opinions dealing with various fee and cost questions. Florida
Ethics Opinion 95-395 responded to the inquiry of a law firm that wished to
assign its delinquent accounts receivable to a corporation that would be
wholly-owned by the firm's partners. The corporation would then attempt to
collect the receivables. If it became necessary to file suit to collect the
accounts, the law firm would then represent
the corporation in suing the
97
fimn's former clients for the delinquent fees.
The Professional Ethics Committee initially published a proposed
advisory opinion 98 concluding that the conduct in question was unethical
because it appeared to be an attempt to hide behind the wholly-owned
corporation in order to avoid the publicity that could arise when a law firm
sues its former clients over fees.99 The committee believed that this scheme

91. Id at 552.

92. 682 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1996).
93. Although not mentioned in the case, it may be noted that the Supreme Court of
Florida has indicated that a lawyer ordinarily is obligated to inform a client when the lawyer
commits legal malpractice. Florida Bar v. Morse, 587 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1991).
94. 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997).
95. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
96. The accounts receivable represented uncollected legal fees owed by former clients of
the law firm. Id.
97. Id.
98. When it determines that a formal advisory opinion is needed on a particular issue or
matter, the Professional Ethics Committee publishes a "'proposed advisory opinion' in the
FloridaBarNews along with a notice inviting comments from any interested Bar members. If
no comments are received within 30 days, the opinion becomes a final Florida Ethics Opinion.
If comments are received, the committee considers those comments and decides whether to
stand by its original opinion. If the committee adheres to its original opinion, any dissatisfied
commenters may appeal to The Florida Bar Board of Governors. The Board's determination
is final; there is no provision for appeal to the Supreme Court. These procedural rules appear
in the FloridaBar Proceduresfor Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 70 FLA. B.J. 684, 864-85

(Sept. 1996).
99. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1996).
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constituted a violation of RPC 4-8.4(c), 10 0 which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in misrepresentation or deceitful conduct.
The committee's proposed conclusion was rejected by the Bar's Board1of1
Governors, which revised Opinion 95-3 to permit the conduct in question.
The Board's opinion traced the trend of ethics opinions issued since the 1970s
to liberalize the guidelines governing lawyer conduct in the area of fee
collection. 10 2 Extending this trend, Opinion 95-3, as revised by the Board,
concluded that the proposed assignment of receivables to the firm-owned
collection corporation, with the firm representing the corporation in collection
actions, violated neither RPC 4-8.4(c) nor RPC 4-1.9(a). 10 3 The Board
viewed the proposed conduct as a legitimate
collection technique for lawyers
10 4
who were owed fees by former clients.
Whether RPC 4-8.4(c)105 was intended to bar the conduct at issue is a
question over which reasonable minds can differ. Thus, the matter boiled
down to a policy question, which the Board answered in favor of law firms
rather than their delinquent clients. 06 The opinion is disappointing, however,
in the manner in which it evaded the reach of RPC 4-1.9(a). This rule
precludes a lawyer 0 7 from representing "another person" in a matter that is
the same as, or substantially related to, a matter in which the lawyer
represented a former client.108 As Opinion 95-3 conceded, the literal terms of
this rule bar a law firm from representing anyone other than itself in matters
substantially related to matters in which it represented its former clients. 0 9
Certainly, collection of a fee owed for representing a client in a matter is
"substantially related" to the original matter; the opinion conceded this fact." 1°
Why, then, does RPC 4-1.9(a) not apply? The opinion essentially stated that
the firm and the wholly-owned collection corporation were really the same
entity, and therefore declined to apply RPC 4-1.9(a)."' As a matter of
convenience for fee collecting lawyers, the opinion thus ignored the basis for

100. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-8.4, "MISCONDUCT," provides that a lawyer shall not
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." RPC 4-8.4(c).
101. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
107. All lawyers in a law firm are treated as one for purposes of RPC 4-1.9(a). RPC 4-

1.10(a).
108.
109.
110.
111.

RPC 4-1.9(a).
Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
Id.

Id.
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a large part of the American legal structure-corporations are separate entities
under law, distinct and apart from their owners. As a separate legal entity, the
collection corporation should have been considered "another person" for
purposes of applying RPC 4-1.9(a). It is important to note, however, that
Opinion 95-3 expressly did not address two questions that should be of great
interest to most law firms facing a fee collection problem: first, whether a law
firm ethically may assign its delinquent fee receivables to a collection
corporation not owned by the firm; and second, whether it is ethically
permissible
for a law firm to assign its accounts receivable as security for a
112
Ioan.
Two Professional Ethics Committee opinions attempted to clear up some
ambiguities in the application of rules governing lawyers advancement, or
payment of costs on behalf of clients. Florida Ethics Opinion 96-1113 was
issued to a lawyer who was preparing to submit a bid to a state agency that
was seeking to hire lawyers for collection work.1 14 The lawyer asked the
ethics committee whether it would be permissible for the bid to provide that
the lawyer would be responsible for paying all expenses associated with the
representation, even if the lawyer was successful in obtaining a recovery for
1 16
the client agency. 115 The committee concluded that, while RPC 4-1.8(e)
permitted the lawyer to advance court costs and expenses of litigation, it
forbade the lawyer from paying for those items. 1 7 The proposed bid was

112. Most jurisdictions that have addressed this second issue prohibit the assignment or
limit a law firm's ability to assign its receivables for this purpose. See, e.g., Arizona ethics
opinion 92-4; Illinois ethics opinion 93-4; Kansas ethics opinion 94-08; Maryland ethics
opinion 93-3; New York City ethics opinion 1993-1.
113. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-1 (1996).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
RPC 4-1.8(e).
117. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-1 (1996). The opinion noted that
RPC 4-1.8(e) contains an exception that allows lawyers to pay costs for indigent clients, but
this exception was inapplicable because a state agency would not be considered indigent. Id.
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declared unethical because it would make the lawyer unconditionally
responsible for the costs of expenses of the collection matters.' 1
Florida Ethics Opinion 96-3119 arose in connection with the Florida offer
of judgment statute. 120 A plaintiffs lawyer apparently was unhappy with the
defendant's settlement offer and wanted his client to go to trial rather than
accept the offer. The lawyer wished to guarantee his client that he, the
lawyer, would pay any attorney's fees and costs assessed against the client if
the client proceeded to trial and the defendant ultimately prevailed. The
ethics committee opined that such a promise would defeat the purpose of the
offer of judgment statute, which the committee believed was enacted to
penalize litigants who did not accept bona fide settlement offers prior to
trial. 12' Accordingly, the committee concluded that the proposal was
unethical
as prejudicial to the administration ofjustice, in violation of RPC 4122
8.4(d).
As usual, 1997 saw several cases handed down concerning lawyer-client
fee issues. At issue in Smith & Burnetti, P.A. v. Faulk123 was a trial court
124
order denying a law firm a charging lien and an award of attorneys' fees.
The law firm apparently had withdrawn from the case, rather than being
discharged by its client. Referencing RPC 4-1.7(b),125 the Second District
Court of Appeal stated that, "[b]ased upon the record disclosing serious
conflict between the law firm and [the client], we are persuaded that the law
firm had no ethical choice but to terminate its relationship with [the

118. See Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
119. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-3 (1997).
120. Id.
121. Id. The committee cited:. Goode v. Udhwani, 648 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995), and Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1989), in support of its view. Id.
122. Id. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4, "MISCONDUCT," provides that a lawyer may
not
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous
indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristic.
RPC 4-8.4(d).
123. 677 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Id. at 404.
125. See supra note 22.
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client].' 26 Because the firn's termination of representation was required by
the rules of ethics, the lower court erred in not permitting the firm to recover
128
fees from the client. 127 Relying upon the leading case of Faro v. Romani,
the appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for determination of
amount of fee to be awarded to firm. 129 Citing Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
that the fee was to be
Barnhart& Shipley, P.A. v. Poletz,130 the opinion noted
3
based upon quantum meruit but without a lodestar.1 '
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the scope of an attorney's
charging lien in Len-Hal Realty, Inc. v. Wintter & Cummings.132 A law firn
had represented a plaintiff in obtaining certain real property through a
mortgage foreclosure. Part of the firm's work included having a bankruptcy
stay lifted for the plaintiff. Affirming the trial court, the appellate court held
that the charging lien filed by the firm in the mortgage foreclosure case could
include the fees relating to the work done by the law firm in the bankruptcy
The work in the bankruptcy case was "directly related to" obtaining
matter.
the property on which the charging lien was imposed. 3
Noris v. Silver 13 was a fee-related case with important implications for
any lawyers who share fees from particular matters, whether in a referral
context or otherwise. 136 Noris sued attorney Silver for legal malpractice and
negligent referral. Noris alleged that he was injured while visiting another
state. He then contacted attorney Silver, who referred him to attorney Falk.
In the past, Silver had referred clients to Falk and had received one-third of
Falk's fee. Noris then retained Falk to handle his injury claim. The NorisFalk employment agreement did not make reference to Silver, and Silver and
Falk did not execute a written fee-division agreement between themselves.
limitations lapse without filing suit.
Falk subsequently let the statute of
137
Noris' action against Silver ensued.
The trial court entered an order of summary judgment for Silver on the
138
legal malpractice claim, and ordered the negligent referral claim dismissed.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Faulk,677 So. 2d at 404.
Id.
641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
Faulk,677 So. 2d at 404.
652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
Faulk,677 So. 2d at 404.
689 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1191.
Id.
21 Fla. L. Weekly D1859 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1996).
Id. at D1859.
Id.
Id.
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment order on
the malpractice claim.139 The court concluded that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether Silver had retained a financial interest in Noris'
40
case by expressly or impliedly agreeing to divide the legal fee with Falk.1
The legal effect of such an agreement would be the creation of a joint venture,
which would mean that Silver could be held legally liable for any malpractice
committed by Falk.141
While the court rested its decision on joint venture principles, it noted
that its conclusion was consistent with RPC 4-1.5(g)(2),142 which allows
attorneys to split fees on the basis of a written agreement among each
participating attorney and the client. 43 RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) is the rule that allows
a lawyer to receive what is commonly called a "referral fee," a fee that one
attorney receives for referring a client to another attorney. The fee is "earned"
primarily as a result of the referral, rather than from any work performed on
the case by the referring attorney.144 Noris underscored what the plain
language of RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) provides: by agreeing to receive a referral fee in
a matter, an attorney becomes responsible for legal malpractice committed by
the attorney to whom the matter has been referred. 145 Furthermore, it would
appear that any attempt by a referring attorney to avoid such liability by
means of an exculpatory or indemnification agreement would be unethical in

139. The order dismissing the negligent referral claim was affirmed. Id. The court
noted that the negligent referral claim "did not allege that Silver had knowledge of any facts
that would indicate that Falk would commit malpractice" and that Noris' counsel conceded
this during oral argument Noris, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1859.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Subdivision (g)(2) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5 (g)(2) (emphasis added).
143. Noris, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1859.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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view of the clear command of RPC 4-1.5(g)(2)(A)
146 that each attorney assume
"joint legal responsibility" for the representation.
In the statutory fee-shifting context, the Eleventh Circuit Court 1of
47
Appeals, in Foodtown, Inc. of Jacksonville v. Argonaut Insurance Co.,
ruled that an oral contingent fee agreement that did not comply with Florida's
ethics rules governing contingent fee contracts could not be considered by the
trial court in determining fees to be awarded to the prevailing party under a
Florida fee-shifting statute. 48 Relying on the authority of Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis,149 the appellate court stated that, "[b]ecause the oral agreement
between [the client] and the law firm violated the rule governing contingent
fees, the district court properly refused to recognize it."' The court went on
to warn that a law firm that failed to have its contingent fee agreements in
writing would be doing so "at its own risk."''1
A Fifth District Court of Appeal decision recognized that the fee-related
aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain a primary factor in the
degree of confidence that the public places in the judicial system. 15 2 In Elser
v. Law Offices of James M Russ, P.A., 53 a lawyer sued a former client for
55
fees. 5 4 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyer.1
The appeals court reversed, finding that material issues of fact existed. 15 6 A

146. RPC 4-1.5(g)(2)(A). Additionally, because RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) requires that the
client join in any fee-division agreement, any liability-limitation attempts by the referring
attorney likely would violate subdivision (h) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST;
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS," which provides:
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently

represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate

in connection therewith.
RPC 4-1.8(h).
147. 102 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 485.
149. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). See Chinaris, supra note 47, at 260-65.
150. Foodtown, 102 F.3d at 485.
151. Id.

152. Elser v. Law Offices of James M. Russ, P.A., 679 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
153. Id.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 311.
156. Id. at 312.
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key fact issue concerned whether it was reasonably necessary for the lawyer to
perform the amount of work completed on the case. 157 The court noted that
"public policy demands" that a lawyer "only charge the client for those hours
that are reasonably necessary to perform the legal services under the
contract.', 158 Additionally, a troubling clause in the lawyer-client fee contract
provided that the client would waive objection to the lawyer's bills unless the
client contested the bill within ten days from the date of billing. The court
voided this provision, declaring it unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.1' 9 "To permit such an egregious clause to be enforceable in an
attorneys'160 fees contract would undermine the public confidence in the legal
system."
Another unconscionable clause in an attorney-client fee agreement was
addressed in Florida Bar v. Spann.16 1 Lawyer and client entered into a
contingent fee agreement, but the agreement further obligated the client to pay
the lawyer based on an hourly rate schedule if the client discharged the lawyer
from the case prior to settlement or final judgment. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that this provision constituted a prohibited penalty on the client's62
right to discharge the lawyer and, as such, was a violation of RPC 4-1.5(a).
This decision affirmed the special nature of the attorney-client relationship
and the client's absolute right to discharge his or her lawyer at any time, with
or without cause. 63 The court has consistently refused to permit 64clauses in
fee agreements that would penalize clients for exercising this right.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
provides:

Elser, 679 So. 2d at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313.
682 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1996).
Id. at 1072-73. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES,"

(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an
unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as
to either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a).
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Charging a fee in excess of that permitted under RPC 4-1.5161 resulted in
a lawyer being publicly reprimanded by the Supreme Court of Florida. 166 In
Florida Bar v. Thomas, 167 a lawyer who represented a personal injury client
on a contingent fee basis in two separate matters paid a medical provider from
$5000 received in "med pay" funds.168 The original bill was $5000, which
was reflected on the closing statement. The problem was that the lawyer
these funds to the doctor, keeping the remainder for
forwarded
169 only $3100 of
himself.
As one might expect, fee issues can also implicate conflict of interest
concerns. One segment of protracted litigation 170 dealt with an appeal of an
order awarding attorneys' fees to several lawyers involved in a wrongful death
matter. 171 In Moreno v. Allen, 172 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed
the order, finding the conduct of the attorneys in seeking the fees to be highly
questionable. 173 The court noted that one of the attorneys had a "severe
conflict of interest" in pursuing a fee claim over the objection of his client
174
that, if successful, would have substantially reduced the client's recovery.
1
Another of the attorneys was denied fees on conflicts grounds as well. 75
A lawyer, of course, is in a fiduciary relationship with a
client. Annually, the case law reflects that some lawyers breach their
fiduciary duties. Misuse of trust funds is perhaps the most egregious example
of such a breach. Disbarment was the result of misappropriation of trust
money and commingling in Florida Bar v. Tillman176 and Florida Bar v.
77
A lesser sanction of six months suspension followed by two years
Porter.1
163. See also, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1982); Goodkind
v. Wolkowsky, 180 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1938).
164. See Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar v. Doe,
550 So. 2d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 1989).
165. The schedule setting forth the maximum contingent fee that ethically can be
charged without specifically procuring court approval is found in subdivision (f)(4)(D) of
RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES." RPC 4-1.5 (f)(4)(D).
166. Florida Bar v. Thomas, 698 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1997).
167. Id. at 530.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 531.
170. See, e.g., Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

171. Id. at 362.
172. 692 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

173. Id. at 959.
174. Id. at 959 n.3.
175. Id. at 958-59.
176. 682 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996).
177. 684 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1996).
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probation178was imposed for trust account irregularities in Florida Bar v.
Barbone.
Competent representation is perhaps the core of the attorney-client
relationship.
It is no coincidence that the first RPC is entitled
"[c]ompetence.' ' 179 Incompetent representation can lead not only to potential
legal malpractice liability but to professional responsibility problems as well.
In 1997, several lawyers were disciplined by the Supreme Court of Florida for
various shades of incompetence. Cases involving sanctions for incompetence
8
included Florida
Bar v. Horowitz,80
1 FloridaBar v. Roberts,1 1 and Florida
18 2
Nunes.
v.
Bar
The ethical obligation of diligence, expressed in RPC 4-1.3,183 follows
closely from the duty of competence. In disciplinary parlance, grievance
complaints
accusing attorneys of lack of diligence are referred to as "neglect"
184
More neglect complaints are filed with The Florida Bar than any
cases.
other type of alleged violation. Inevitably, some of these complaints result in
imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
A lawyer's failure to promptly deliver funds held in trust, when coupled
with other violations, led to a suspension of ninety-one days in FloridaBar v.
Laing.18 In Florida Bar v. Jordan,186 the lawyer was suspended for ninetyone days for, among other things, a failure to file required documents that
resulted in dismissal of a client's appeal. 187 In Florida Bar v. Barcus,I8 8 the
lawyer was publicly reprimanded for several instances of neglect, including
failure to appear at a deposition and failure to file necessary motions.18 9 The
disciplinary sanction could have been greater, as the court noted: "[The
lawyer] committed isolated acts of negligence, but we do not find a pattern of
negligence which would require a suspension.We find this to be a case of an

178. 679 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1996).
179. Rule 4-1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1.
180. 697 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1997).
181. 689 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1997).
182. 679 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1996).
183. Rule 4-1.3, "DILIGENCE," provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." RPC 4-1.3.
184. RPC 4-1.3.
185. 695 So. 2d 299, 304 (Fla. 1997).
186. 682 So. 2d 548 (FIa. 1996).
187. Id. at 549.
188. 697 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1997).
189. Id. at 74-75.
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attorney who ineptly handled a difficult situation." 19° ' And, of course, missing

a statute of limitations 191
violates the duty of diligence, as was the case in

FloridaBar v. Lecznar.

A logical, but unfortunate, occasional consequence of a lack of diligence
is the lawyer's failure to follow the ethical rules that govern withdrawal from
a representation. Simply walking away from a representation, even one that is
not in litigation, is not sufficient. A withdrawing lawyer must comply with
RPC 4-1.16,192 which requires, at a minimum, proper notice to the client and
190. Id. at 75. Two justices, however, would have imposed a thirty day suspension. Id.
(Grimes, J., dissenting).
191. 690 So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 1997). See also supra text accompanying note 183.
192. Rule 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or
if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a
tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation.
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which

240
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an attempt by the lawyer to reasonably protect the client's interests upon
withdrawal. 193 Failure to properly withdraw can be considered abandonment
of the client, as was the case in Florida Bar v. Brakefield. 194 The lawyer's
neglect and abandonment of several clients resulted
in a six month
195
suspension, along with probation and other sanctions.
Ill. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Lawyers often are referred to as "officers of the court" and, as such, they
have ethical responsibilities to the leading officers of the court, judges, and to
the judicial system in general. This position as an integral part of our
jurisprudential system has long required that lawyers comply with certain
standards of conduct, as set forth in the RPC. 196 Florida case law in 1997
addressed a variety of issues in this area, such as a lawyer's duty of candor to
a court, the extent to which a lawyer may communicate with jurors after a
trial, grounds for a lawyer's disqualification from participating in litigation,
and the permissible scope of argument before a jury.
The past year saw interest in the lawyer's status as an officer of the court
and a member of a learned profession carried to a new level. The Supreme
Court of Florida created a "Commission on Professionalism" consisting of
judges, lawyers, legal educators, and public representatives and charged them
with the responsibility of ensuring "that the fundamental ideals and values of
the justice system and the legal profession are inculcated in all of those
persons serving or seeking to serve in the system."' 97 The Florida Bar pitched
in, creating and funding a "Center for Professionalism."' 9 The Continuing
Legal Education ("CLE") Requirement rules were amended to mandate that
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
RPC 4-1.16.
193. Id.
194. 679 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. 1996). See also Florida Bar v. King, 664 So. 2d 925
(Fla. 1995); Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1987).
195. Brakefield, 679 So. 2d at 769-70.
196. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Such obligations in the current Florida
RPC often are based on ethics rules that existed in prior professional responsibility codes.
See, e.g., Code of Professional Responsibility, 59 FLA. B.J. 439, 439 (Sept. 1985) (citing
former rule DR 7-102(B) of Florida Code of ProfessionalResponsibility).
197. In re Florida Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism, Fla. Admin. Order
(Fla. July 19, 1996).
198. The Center will have a budget of almost $300,000 annually. See, e.g., Gary
Blankenship, Board Okays 97-98 Budget, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1997, at 1, 6; The Florida
BarProposedBudget for Fiscal 1997-98, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 12.
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lawyers complete at least five hours every three years of continuing education
199
courses in some combination of ethics, professionalism, or substance abuse.
Despite the interest in Florida surrounding the issue of
"professionalism," 200 it remains to be seen what effect, if any, these initiatives
will have on the conduct of lawyers. "Professionalism" means different
things to different people, so it will be hard to measure whether the behavior
of lawyers becomes more "professional." Although ethics education has been
mandatory for years,20 ' many Florida lawyers seemingly cannot grasp the most
elemental notions of fiduciary duty. 20 2 If the threat of disciplinary sanctions
for the violation of mandatory professional ethics rules has not transformed
the behavior of lawyers, one might question how an aspirational
"professionalism" program can be expected to achieve more favorable results.
Several cases addressed a variety of issues relating to a lawyer's
relationship with the judicial system, including lawyers' ethical obligation of
candor toward a tribunal. Misrepresentation to a court remains one of the
most serious offenses that an attorney can commit.2 3 In Florida Bar v.
Kravitz,2 0 4 a lawyer who made multiple misrepresentations to a judge was not
only held in contempt but ultimately was suspended from the practice of law

199. The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 697 So. 2d
115 (Fla. 1997). Ironically, the new rule actually allows a lawyer to escape entirely any CLE
course in the ethics rules (the very rules to which compliance is mandatory) by taking five
hours of courses in "professionalism" or substance abuse. Id. at 133. While these two
subjects are important, it is unfortunate that the new requirement permits lawyers to evade
basic ethics education.
200. See, e.g., Hillsborough Takes Top ProfessionalismAward, FLA. B. NEWS, Aug. 1,
1997, at 1; Mary Smith Judd, FloridaProfessionalismEfforts May Be a Model for Others,
FLA. B. NEWs, May 15, 1997, at 9; Mary Smith Judd, President Notes Progress on
ProfessionalismFront, FLA. B. NEWS, June 15, 1997, at 19; Mary Smith Judd, Professional
Commission Shares Passionfor Profession, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at 1; Mark D.
Killian, Frost Tells St. Thomas Students to Strive for Professionalism, FLA. B. NEWS, June 1,
1997, at 11; Workers' Comp Section to Set ProfessionalismStandards,FLA. B. NEWS, July 15,

1997, at 21.
201. In 1987 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a "Continuing Legal Education
Requirement," whereby lawyers must take at least two hours of ethics education every three
years. Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Continuing Legal
Education, 510 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1987).
202. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida

Law, 21 NovA L. REV. 231, 254-55, 274-76 (1996); Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional
Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in Review, 20 NOVA L. REv. 223, 229-30, 251-52

(1995).
203. See supra notes 65 and 100 and accompanying text.
204. 694 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997).
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for thirty days. 205 Among other offenses, the lawyer lied to the judge about a
matter of which he had personal knowledge, and falsely represented to the
judge that opposing counsel did not object to entry of a proposed
"agreed"
20
20 7
order. 20 6 This conduct violated RPC 4-3.3(a) and 4-8.4(c). F
A lawyer who filed an affidavit in a bankruptcy case falsely stating that
he had no connection with the debtor was suspended for ninety-one days in
FloridaBar v. Norvell.20 9 Disbarment was the sanction imposed in Florida
Bar v. Catalano,210 after the lawyer made both written and oral
misrepresentations to the court in a civil matter.211 In Florida Bar v.
Kaufman,2 2 disbarment also resulted when a lawyer falsely testified in an
attempt
to evade discovery of his assets in a civil suit in which he was a
2 13
party.
In our legal system, a constant source of tension is the conflict between a
lawyer's duty to effectively represent the client and the duty to be honest and
forthright with the court. It seems, however, that in an adversarial system any
legitimate doubts that a lawyer has should be resolved in favor of the client.
A lawyer can have disclosure obligations to a court regarding both the facts
and the law.214 The extent of these obligations may be easier to determine
with regard to the law.215 In addition to general rules that prohibit a lawyer
from making false or misleading statements to a court, a special rule, RPC 43.3(a)(3), imposes a duty to disclose to a court "legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. '216
This duty was addressed in Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc.
A trial court
granted summary judgment, relying on a particular statute that apparently
immunized the defendant from liability.218 The problem with the court's
ruling, however, was that the statute had not become effective until after the
date of the accident in question. Defense counsel had failed to disclose this
205. Id. at 725.
206. Id. at 726.
207. See supra note 65.
208. See supra note 100.
209. 685 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1996). The lawyer was guilty of other violations as well. Id.
at 1296-97.
210. 685 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1996).
211. Id. at 1300.
212. 684 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1996).
213. Id. at 807.
214. RPC 4-3.3(a).
215. Id.

216. RPC 4-3.3(a)(3).
217. 687 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
218. Id. at 354-55.
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fact to the court; on appeal, counsel conceded that he had not checked the
effective date before arguing for summary judgment below. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal considered RPC 4-3.3(a)(3) in conjunction with RPC
4-1.1,211 which mandates competent representation, and stated that these rules
220
"imply a duty to know and disclose to the court adverse legal authority.

Trial counsel is required by these rules "to provide full information to the trial
court such that the court has all necessary information to determine the issue
presented to it."221 Trial counsel's failure to know and disclose the effective
date had failed to meet these standards, and the judgment was reversed.222
In contrast to the clear requirement to disclose adverse legal authority,
there is no corresponding duty to volunteer adverse facts. 2 Schlapper v.
Mauer224 was a medical malpractice case in which a defendant doctor was

granted summary judgment dismissing him as a party.225 Plaintiff's counsel
had not opposed the motion for summary judgment because he was advised
by the doctor's law26yer that the doctor "had nothing to do with the treatment

of" the plaintiff.22 After discovering that this statement was totally false,
plaintiff's counsel moved to vacate the summary judgment. Affirming the
trial court's order vacating the summary judgment, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal concluded that defense counsel's conduct violated the ethical
prohibition against misrepresentations of fact that is imposed by RPC 4-4.1.227
The court explained:
Because of the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney's
fiduciary duty owed to a client, an attorney has no affirmative duty
to inform an opposing party or attorney as to the existence of
relevant facts. But misrepresentations about facts, as well as

219. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
220. Dilallo,687 So. 2d at 355 (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Schlapper v. Mauer, 687 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1997).
224. Id. at 982.
225. Id. at 983.
226. Id. at 984.
227. Id. at 985. Rule 4-4.1, "TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS,"
provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-4.1.
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procedures and future conduct likewise is forbidden. . . . An
attorney has the option of keeping silent, refusing to answer,
changing the subject or referring counsel
to the discovery process.
22

But he or she cannot misstate the facts.

1

A dissenting opinion in Steinhorst v. State229 contained interesting
comments regarding the ethical obligations of a lawyer who was aware that
the trial judge had a conflict of interest that, as a matter of judicial ethics,
would require the judge's recusal from the case. 230 The judge had recused
himself in a co-defendant's case due to a conflict, but failed to recuse himself
from this case despite the presence of the same conflict. The majority upheld
the conviction, concluding that the judge's conflict could have been
discovered by defense counsel with the exercise of due diligence.2 31 Justice
Anstead's dissent expressed the view that the prosecutor, as32well as the judge,
had the duty to disclose the judge's conflict to the defense.2
The ethical limitations on a lawyer's post-trial communication with
jurors are set forth in RPC 4-3.5(d)(4).23 3 In Kriston v. Webster,234 a lawyer
for the defendant interviewed jurors without following the procedure specified

228. Schlapper, 687 So. 2d at 985.
229. 695 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1251.
231. Id. at 1247.
232. Id. at 1251.
233. Subdivision (d)(4) of RPC 4-3.5, "IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE
TRIBUNAL," provides:
(d) Communication With Jurors. A lawyer shall not:
(4) after dismissal of the jury in a case with which the lawyer is connected,
initiate communication with or cause another to initiate communication with
any juror regarding the trial except to determine whether the verdict may be
subject to legal challenge; provided, a lawyer may not interview jurors for
this purpose unless the lawyer has reason to believe that grounds for such
challenge may exist; and provided further, before conducting any such
interview the lawyer must file in the cause a notice of intention to interview
setting forth the name of the juror or jurors to be interviewed. A copy of the
notice must be delivered to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable
time before such interview. The provisions of this rule do not prohibit a
lawyer from communicating with members of the venire or jurors in the
course of official proceedings or as authorized by court rule or written order
of the court.
RPC 4-3.5 (d)(4).
234. 688 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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by this rule.235 The trial court ultimately granted the defense's motion for a
new trial, but in doing so expressly stated that it was ignoringthe improper
juror interviews and granting the new trial on other grounds. 6 Regarding
counsel's noncompliance with RPC 4-3.5(d)(4), the court stated:
Knowledge and observance of the rules regulating a lawyer's
ethical conduct with respect to jury and court contacts is as
important in the practice of the profession as knowing the
substantive law. Ignorance or non-observance of those rules
of the Bar and of the individual lawyer who
affects the reputation
237
violates them.
In Kriston, the court referred to the procedures that are required as a
matter of attorney ethics by RPC 4-3.4(d)(4), 238 but made no reference to
Rule 1.321(h) of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure,239 which also outlines
required juror-contact procedures. 240 The relationship between the ethics rule
and the rule of procedure was addressed, however, in a Third District Court of
Appeal case, Seymour v. Soloman.24 1 Following the trial in this case,
plaintiff's counsel contacted three jurors. At that time counsel was aware of
no grounds to challenge the verdict or to support a motion to interview the
jurors. From one of these contacts, counsel learned that one of the jurors had
known the defendant. Counsel moved for a new trial, and the court responded
by setting an evidentiary hearing to interview the juror.242 The appellate court

235. Id. at 347.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 348.
238. RPC 4-3.4(d)(4).
239. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(h) provides:
Interview of a Juror. A party who believes that grounds for legal challenge
to a verdict exists may move for an order permitting an interview of ajuror or
jurors to determine whether the verdict is subject to the challenge. The
motion shall be served within 10 days after rendition of the verdict unless
good cause is shown for the failure to make the motion within that time. The
motion shall state the name and address of each juror to be interviewed and
the grounds for challenge that the party believes may exist. After notice and
hearing, the trial judge shall enter an order denying the motion or permitting
the interview. If the interview is permitted, the court may prescribe the place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the interview.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h).
240. Kriston, 688 So. 2d at 347.
241. 683 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
242. Id. at 168.
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quashed the trial court's order, noting that counsel had violated Florida Rule
Civil Procedure 1.43 1(h) by contacting jurors without filing a motion with the
court, without notice and hearing, and without leave of court. 43 In a footnote,
the court recognized that RPC 4-3.5(d) "governs the propriety of attorneys'45
' 244 Citing the preamble to the RPC,
actions in relations to juror interviews.
however, the court stated
that the ethics rules are "not intended to supplement
' 246
court procedural rules.
A trial judge's authority to disqualify an attorney from representing a
client in a particular case is an important aspect of our court system. This
authority allows the judge to prevent one party from being placed at an unfair
disadvantage in litigation due to reasons such as improper access to
confidential information, an attorney's failure to honor ethical obligations, or
even the "appearance of impropriety."2 47 Two cases at the appellate level
dealt with the issue of disqualification as a result of alleged access to
confidential information.
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the question of how the
conflicts rules apply to a lawyer who may have been previously involved in a
matter in a nonlawyer capacity.
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v.
Buenaagua248 concerned a former adjuster for a cruise line's insurance claims
manager who became a lawyer and opposed the cruise line in Jones Act
cases. 249 The cruise line's motions to disqualify the lawyer in four unrelated
cases were denied. The appellate court denied certiorari, concluding that the
current matters were not "substantially related" to matters on which the
lawyer previously worked as an adjuster.2 50 The court noted the presence of
four significant factors: 1) four years had passed since the lawyer left the
claims manager; 2) the current matters arose after the lawyer left the claims
manager; 3) the claims manager and the cruise line were no longer associated;
and 4) the claims manager did not adjust the matters in question.25 ' The

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 168 n. 1.
RPC, "PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESONSIBILITIES."
Seymour, 683 So. 2d at 168 n. I (citing Preamble to Rules Regulating The Florida

Bar).
247. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991).
Unlike the former Code of Professional Responsibility, Florida's current RPC no longer
contains a rule against the "appearance of impropriety." Id. Nevertheless, judges may use an
"appearance of impropriety" standard in ruling on motions to disqualify counsel. Id. at 634.
248. 685 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
249. Id. at 8.
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 8-10. In the court's view, these factors distinguished this case from its prior
decision in Tuazon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
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cruise line failed to show that any information to which the lawyer, 252as
adjuster, had access gave him an unfair advantage in the present matters.
The court further noted that information relevant to each case (e.g.,
"shipboard conditions, cleaning practices, maintenance procedures") could be
obtained through discovery.2 53 Citing the comment to RPC 4-1.9,254 the court
concluded that a "changing of sides in the matter in question" by the lawyer
had not occurred.255 The court further stated that the fact that all Jones Act
cases are all similar to 25some
degree was insufficient to warrant
6
disqualification of the lawyer.

Unfair access to confidential information as grounds for disqualification
in a joint representation situation was at issue in Double T Corp. v. Jalis
Development, Inc.25 7 Several co-defendants were jointly represented in the
defense of a civil matter. Plaintiffs counsel gained access to one codefendant's corporate files after that co-defendant filed for bankruptcy, and
the bankruptcy trustee waived that co-defendant's attorney-client privilege.
The remaining co-defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, but the
trial court denied the motion.258 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed
and ordered disqualification.2 5 9 "As a result of the bankruptcy trustee's
1994) (finding plaintiff's attorney who previously worked as adjuster for defendant cruise line
disqualified on grounds that he had access to confidential information in that capacity).
252. Royal Caribbean,685 So. 2d at 11.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Id. The comment to RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; FORMER
CLIENT," provides in pertinent part:
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of rule 4-1.9(a) may depend on the facts
of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter
can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved
in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with
materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer
who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded
from later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type
even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the
prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military
lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military
jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved
in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a
changing of sides in the matter in question.
RPC 4-1.9 cmt.
255. Royal Caribbean,685 So. 2d at 10 (citing RPC 4-1.9 cmt. (1992)).
256. Id. at 11.
257. 682 So. 2d 1160, 1160 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct. App. 1996).
258. Id. at 1161.
259. Id.
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege, [plaintiffs] counsel has received an
informational advantage over the defendants who agreed to joint
representation, as [the bankrupt's] corporate files include
attorney-client
260
communications regarding the pending civil litigation."
Disqualification as a means of preventing a lawyer from acting in the
dual roles of advocate and witness at trial was the subject of several
cases. With limited exceptions, RPC 4-3.7 ethically precludes a lawyer from
representing a client at trial if that lawyer will be a "necessary witness on
behalf of the client., 261 Disqualification under this rule is not warranted
where the lawyer will not be a material witness. 26 In a domestic relations
case, Pascucci v. Pascucci,2 63 opposing counsel moved to disqualify the
wife's lawyer based on alleged communications with a psychologist who
treated the wife and children, claiming those discussions made the lawyer a
material witness.2 64 The trial court granted the motion, but the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed the order.265 The record reflected no evidence that
the wife's lawyer would be a material witness.
Even if counsel had gained information, this would not make
counsel a material, necessary or essential witness because anything
he could conceivably testify to would be inadmissible hearsay.
Any possible argument that counsel could be a witness vanished

260. Id.
261. Rule 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9.
RPC 4-3.7.
262. Id.
263. 679 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
264. Id. at 1312.
265. Id. at 1313.
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when the trial court denied former wife's motion for266
protective
order and permitted the deposition [of the psychologist].

On a related point, the appellate court noted that the conflict of interest rule,
RPC 4-1.7(b) 267 "does not require an attorney to withdraw when the opposing
party has instituted collateral litigation against the attorney personally. ' 268
Two other cases concerning applicability of RPC 4-3.7 have helped clear
up uncertainty concerning the extent of the disqualification imposed under
this rule. The rule on its face states that a disqualified lawyer-witness cannot
"act as advocate at a trial.,269 It does not, however, refer to possible pre-trial
or post-trial representation. In Fleitman v. McPherson,2 0 the First District
Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court had erred in not disqualifying a
lawyer who was likely to be a "featured witness" at trial.27 Significantly, the
court went on to state that the lawyer "may participate in the representation up
until the trial and after the trial, but may not participate as an attorney at
trial., 272
The conclusion that RPC 4-3.7(a) does not bar pre-trial
representation was also reached in United States v. Abbell, 273 which
concerned a criminal defendant's lawyer who was to be called as274a
government witness at trial to testify regarding his client's co-defendant.
The court ruled that the lawyer was disqualified under RPC 4-3.7(a)275 from
representing his client at trial, but was not disqualified from pre-trial
representation.27 6
As in many areas of lawyering, delay in pursuing a motion to disqualify
opposing counsel can be fatal. A federal court in Florida denied a motion for
disqualification that was filed five months after suit was instituted and eight
months after the filing of a related case. 27 7 The court in ConcernedParentsof
78
Jordan ParM
held that the untimeliness in the
filing of the disqualification
279
motion acted as a waiver of the right to object.
266. Id. at 1312.
267. RPC 4-1.7(b); see supra note 22.
268. Pascucci,679 So. 2d at 1312.
269. RPC 4-3.7(a) (emphasis added); see supra note 261.
270. 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
271. Id. at38.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. 939 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
274. Id. at 862.
275. RPC 4-3.7(a); see supra note 261.
276. Abbell, 939 F. Supp. at 864.
277. Concerned Parents of Jordan Park v. Housing Auth. of St. Petersburg, 934 F. Supp.
406, 408 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
278. Id. at 406.
279. Id. at 408.
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The permissible scope of a lawyer's argument to a jury, and responses of
the court and The Florida Bar when those bounds are exceeded, were
addressed in a number of cases. District Courts of Appeal for each district,
except the second, published decisions in this area. In Winterberg v.
Johnson,28 the First District Court of Appeal expressed its position that
argument that is unethical and improper under RPC 4-3.4(e)2 "does not
necessarily constitute fundamental or harmful error.' 282 Rather, the court will
focus on whether the misconduct could have been cured by a jury instruction
from the trial court, and whether the argument was so egregious as to preclude
the jury from fairly considering the case.283 The court noted that, while
interested in the conduct of attorneys, its primary consideration was not
attorney discipline, but the fairness of trial proceedings. 284 Similar decisions
were reached by the First District Court of Appeal in City of Jacksonville v.
Tresca285 and Hicks v. Yellow FreightSystems, Inc. 286
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Hampton v. State,8 7 concluded
288
that an improper argument that was not objected to did not require reversal.
The prosecution had agreed not to mention a certain tape to the jury. Despite
this agreement, when the prosecutor began his closing argument, he brought
up the tape. Defense counsel did not object, and this failure to object
proved
89
costly when the appellate court declined to find fundamental error.
Also addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal was improper
29°
argument
thatpersonal
was alleged
to bewere
"invited."
of the
prosecutor's
opinion
condemnedRepeated
by the expressions
court in Fryer
v.

280. 692 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
281. Rule 4-3.4(e), "FAIRNESS OF OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL," provides
that a lawyer may not
in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
282. Winterberg, 692 So. 2d at 255.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 692 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
286. 694 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
287. 680 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
288. Id. at 585.
289. Id.
290. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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State291 as "patently improper and violative of the rules of professional
conduct." 292 Defense counsel objected to some of the statements. The court
reversed the conviction, ruling that an the prosecutor's responses to defense
counsel's "inviting" comments went far beyond merely "'righting the scale"'
and prejudiced the jury.293 A concurring opinion characterized 294
the actions of
both counsel as a "monumental display of attorney misconduct."
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam the trial court's
judgment in Donahue v. FPA Corp. 9 The concurring opinion in Donahue
expressed the view that an unobjected-to closing argument that violated RPC
4-3.4(e) 296 was not necessarily fundamental error. 297 The concurrence
298
distinguished the court's prior holding in Norman v. Gloria Farms,Inc.
The concurring opinion declared the author's "hope that publishing unethical
299
remarks and the name of the lawyer making them will serve as a deterrent."
In American ChambersLife Insurance Co. v. Hall,300 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal concluded that isolated "'send a message"' and "'conscience
of the community"' arguments, while clearly improper, are not always per 3se
02
harmful. 30 1 Another improper argument case, Grushoff v. Denny's, Inc.
concerned a "golden rule" argument.30 3 The argument in question had been
objected to, and the objections were sustained. On the basis of the argument,
the trial court granted a new trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that
"golden rule" arguments were not per se reversible error but must be
evaluated under the same standard as other improper argument: whether the
subject argument was "highly prejudicial and inflammatory. ' 3 4 Here, the
argument fell short of this standard. °0
The voice of the Fifth District Court of Appeal was heard in the form of
a lengthy dissent in Schlotterlein v. State.? 6 The dissenting opinion
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049 (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
677 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
RPC 4-3.4(e); see supra note 281.
Donahue, 677 So. 2d at 883-84 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
Id. (citing Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

1996)).
299. Donahue, 677 So. 2d at 883 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
300. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1381 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 1997).

301. Id. atD1381.
302. 693 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

303. Id. at 1069.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 683 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
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characterized the prosecutor's closing argument as containing statements
bolstering the credibility of state's witnesses and vouching for their
veracity,7308 as well as expressions of personal opinion as to the guilt of the
accused. The dissent would have reversed the conviction on the grounds of
this improper argument, which the author believed violated RPC 4-3.4(e) "in
multiple regards., 30 9 It is interesting to note, despite the numerous reported
cases dealing with various aspects of improper and unprofessional argument,
there appear to have been no reported instances of disciplinary sanctions
being assessed against the perpetrators.
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD PARTIES

A lawyer's ethical obligations extend beyond dealings with his or her
client. FloridaRules of ProfessionalConduct impose minimum requirements
in a lawyer's dealings with third parties. These duties include whether and
how an attorney can communicate with third parties, and honesty and fairness
in dealing with third parties and others. This section discusses cases which
have impacted these areas.
Perhaps the area of the most court activity has been the propriety of
lawyers' communications with others. The Supreme Court of Florida settled
the question of communications with the former employees of a defendant
corporation 310 in the case of H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of
Schwartz.31 1 The court found that under RPC 4-4.2, ex parte contact with
former employees of a defendant corporation is permissible. 1 2 The court
upheld the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and disapproved of the position
taken by the Second District Court of Appeal in Barfuss v. DiversicareCorp.

307. Id. at 568.
308. Id. at 571.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., in support of the proposition that such conduct is permissible, Fla. Bar
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-14 (1989); Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611
So. 2d 1305, 1308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). But see, e.g., United States v. Florida Cities
Water Co., No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1995 WL 340980, *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995);
Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992),
aff'd, 43 F.3d 1439, 1440 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d
486, 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
311. 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997).
312. H.B.A. Management, 693 So. 2d at 544. Rule 4-4.2 provides in pertinent part: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer." RPC 4-4.2.
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of America.31 3 Adopting the position taken by Florida Ethics Opinion 8814, s 14 the court stated:
An employee's departure terminates the agency or respondeat
superior connection that had previously permitted that employee to
create liability for her employer or to bind or make admissions for
that employer. Hence, the underlying concerns and purpose of rule
4-4.2 is simply no longer served by restricting contacts with former
employees.315
Following the Schwartz case, the Second District Court of Appeal quashed a
trial court order which prohibited plaintiff's counsel from communicating
with former employees of a nursing center. 316 Plaintiffs counsel wished to
contact former employees of a nursing home who, while employed there, had
cared for the now-deceased patient whose estate was suing the nursing
home.317 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision
318 in
Schwartz in quashing the lower court order and permitting such contact.
Regarding communication between a prosecutor and a criminal
defendant who was represented by counsel, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that the presence of the prosecutor at the jail while police investigators
spoke with the inmate was not improper in Rolling v. State of
Florida.319 Danny Rolling was accused of serial killings'and incarcerated in
the Alachua County jail awaiting trial.
During the course of his
imprisonment, another inmate, Bobby Lewis, sought to obtain an advantage in
his own case by becoming an informant against Rolling. Lewis repeatedly
contacted investigators regarding information he claimed to have about the
murders, while investigators refused to offer him any benefit for revealing
such information. Lewis then enlisted the help of Rolling in his plan to obtain
a better deal for himself, in which Rolling, through Lewis, requested to speak
with homicide investigators. Upon being told by police investigators that his
lawyers would be opposed to such contact, Rolling terminated the interview.
Lewis continued to attempt to contact police to make a deal for himself.
Ultimately, Rolling requested another interview with the police, at which

313. Id. at 546 (citing Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d

Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
314. Fla. Bar of Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 88-14 (1989).
315. H.B.A. Management, 693 So. 2d at 546.
316. Henry v. Nat'l Health Care Affiliates, Inc., 696 So. 2d 1223, 1223 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).

317. Id.
318. Id.
319. 695 So. 2d 278, 292 (Fla. 1997).
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Lewis would also be present to speak for Rolling. The prosecutor in the case
came to the jail to be present while investigators spoke with Rolling, so that
he would be available to answer questions posed by the investigators
interviewing Rolling. Rolling subsequently plead guilty to the murders and
was sentenced to death.320
Rolling appealed his sentence on several grounds, including that his
statements to investigators should be suppressed based on alleged violations
by the prosecutor of RPC 4-4.231 and 4-5.3.322 Rolling contended that the
prosecutor not only participated in the interview by being present, but also
directed the course of the interview, thereby violating RPC 4-4.2 and 45.3. The trial court made a specific finding that the prosecutor did not violate
the rules:
As legal advisor to the law enforcement officers, he [Nilon] made
himself available to render such advice as was appropriate under
the circumstances. Mr. Nilon was careful to insure that he did not
participate in any of the interviews with the Defendant, but was
available to advise law enforcement officers should such advice be
sought. The fact that Mr. Nilon was in geographic proximity to the
site of the interview, rather than merely being available to render

320. Id. at 282.
321. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
322. Rule 4-5.3 states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.
RPC 4-5.3.

1997]

Chinaris/ Tarbert
advice by telephone, does not rise to
323the level of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Supreme Court affirmed the court's denial of the motion to suppress
"[b]ecause the evidence in the record and inferences derived therefrom
support the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's presence at the prison
4
32 to
render advice if needed did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct."
It is important to note that the conduct complained of appeared in the
context of a motion to suppress evidence.3 25 The court upheld the trial court
326
on the motion to suppress by failing to disturb the lower court's finding.
Since there was evidence to support the lower court's finding that no violation
of the rules occurred, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to overturn the
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.327 The court also emphasized
that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the prosecutor participated
in the interview between the police and the accused which was instigated at
the request of the accused.328 Attorneys should not assume that they can infer
from this case that it is permissible to participate in any way in discussions
between their clients or others and persons who have counsel.3 29
Additionally, attorneys should not assume that they may be present at
discussions between their clients or others and persons represented by
counsel, since the court specifically found that the prosecutor's role in this
instance was to "ensure that Rolling's constitutional rights were not violated
by any conduct of Task Force investigators." 330
The case of Jackson v. Motel 6 Multi-Purposes, Inc.33 1 determines the
permissible extent of communications with actual and potential members of a
class prior to class certification. 332 Plaintiffs' attorneys had sought leave to
depart from rule 4.04(e),333 and be permitted to communicate with actual and
potential class members, which were potentially numerous. The magistrate
allowed such departure in an order which permitted the following: 1)
communication through an 800 number for persons to reach the plaintiffs

323. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
329. Participation would include, e.g., drafting questions or documents for presentation
to the opposing party, and the like.
330. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
331. 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D500 (M.D. Feb. 24, 1997).
332. Id. at D501.
333. LocAL P, M.D. FLA. 4.04.
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attorneys; 2) publication of notices, response to requests for information by
parties or class members, except for management or supervisory employees;
and 3) letters through the mail so long as there was no solicitation to become
plaintiffs, and the communications identified the attorney, the litigation, and
the purpose of the communication.334 The order was appealed, and the court
found that the order was appropriate with certain modifications. 335 The court
added the following: 1) mailings could not be directed to persons with
managerial or supervisory positions in Motel 6; 2) plaintiffs' counsel could
not solicit for payment of fees or expenses; 3) no ex parte communication
could be made to persons with managerial and/or supervisory positions in
Motel 6; 4) ex parte communication must be preceded by identification of the
plaintiff or attorney, identification of the litigation and its status, identification
of the purpose of the communication to discuss potential discriminatory
practices of Motel 6, a statement that the person could refuse to participate in
the communication, and a statement that the allegations had not yet been
proven; and 5) the communications must comply with any applicable rules of
court, evidence, or The Florida Bar.336 Most significantly, for the purpose of
this article, is the statement that any communication must comply with Florida
Bar Rules.337 Potentially, in addition to the rules regulating communication
with persons represented by counsel 338 and persons not 34
represented
by
0
counsel, 339 the rules regulating attorney advertising may apply.
Finally, regarding commercial communications by an attorney to
potential clients, Babkes v. Satz34 1 struck down a statute prohibiting the
commercial use of names and addresses of persons who have received traffic
tickets.342
Section 316.650(11) of the Florida Statutes provides that
information in traffic citations "shall not be used for commercial solicitation

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Jackson, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D501.
Id. at D503.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
Rule 4-4.3 states the following:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RPC 4-4.3.
340. See RPC 4-7.
341. 944 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
342. Id. at 914.
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purposes. 343 Florida attorney Babkes challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, stating that it restricted his First Amendment right to free speech. The
court, in using the CentralHudson344 four-pronged test, found that the speech
is commercial speech under the First Amendment and that the State of Florida
has a substantial interest in preserving privacy and restricting abuse of
solicitation.34 5 However, the State of Florida failed to prove that the statute
directly advances the government interest under the test.
Further, the court
found that the State of Florida failed to show that "a 'more limited speech
regulation would be ineffective.' 347 The court then granted a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the statute.34 8
The court will scrutinize not only whether communications may be
made, but also the content of such communications. The court found in
FloridaBar v. Roth,349 that an attorney may not threaten criminal prosecution
to gain an advantage ina civil case. 350 Roth, in negotiating a settlement in a
trust case, indicated that he could prosecute the opposing party's husband in a
molestation case based on an alleged incident many years ago as there is no
statute of limitations on child molestation cases. The court found that the
mere mention of the sexual molestation allegations in the conversation was a
of RPC 4-4.4351
threat for the purpose of settling the civil matter, in violation
312 which warranted a public reprimand. 353
and 4-8.4(d),
A lawyer has an obligation of fair and honest dealings with third parties.
The Supreme Court of Florida in FloridaBar v. Bosse3 54 reprimanded an
attorney for avoiding his obligation to pay an expert witness fee. 355 The
attorney had hired the expert for his defense in a prior grievance matter, in
343. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(11) (1995).
344. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557

(1980).
345. Babkes, 944 F. Supp. at 912.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 913 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980)).
348. Id. at 914.

349. 693 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1997).
350. Id. at 972.
351. Rule 4-4.4 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person."
RPC 4-4.4.
352. The rule states that an attorney shall not "engage in conduct in connection with the
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
353. Roth, 693 So. 2d at 971.
354. 689 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).
355. Id. at 268.
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which the attorney was awarded costs against the Bar after winning the case.
The Bar sent a check for the costs to the attorney, which was deposited in his
personal joint checking account by his wife. Bosse neither paid the expert
witness with the funds, nor notified the expert that the funds had been
received. In defending his actions to the court, Bosse stated that the funds
had been deposited and spent, and that he therefore had not willfully failed to
pay the expert witness fee. However, the records indicated that Bosse had
sufficient funds in the account to pay the amount of the expert's fee during
the time period in which he claimed it was spent.356 The court found that he
3 7
violated Rule of Discipline 3-4.3 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 1
and RPC 4-8.4(c)3 58 in failing to use the cost award to pay the35witness'
fee
9
and in misrepresenting his finances to avoid payment of his debt.
Lawyers also have obligations in dealing with potential creditors as
evidenced by Florida Bar v. Cramer.360 Cramer used the name of a third
person, who had a substantial net worth, on his application to a financial
institution for credit in purchasing computer equipment. Cramer had
previously been turned down for credit when applying in his own
name. Ultimately, Cramer stopped making payments on the leases. Cramer
raised as a defense that the third party knew that he was using his name and
that an officer of the financial institution ratified the use of the third party's
name. The court found that regardless of third party contact or authorization
of the fraud, Cramer was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. 361 The court
disbarred Cramer, taking into consideration his past discipline which also
included "subterfuge in money matters. 362

356. Id. at 269.
357. Rule of Discipline 3-4.3 provides that: "The commission by a lawyer of any act
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice... may constitute a cause for discipline."
RULES OF DISCIPLINE 3-4.3.
358. Rule 4-8.4(c) provides that: "A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." RPC 4-8.4(c).
359. Bosse, 689 So. 2d at 269.
360. 678 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1996).
361. The court found that Cramer specifically violated the following rules:
3-4.3 (committing an act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice);
4-4.1(a) (making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in
the course of representing a client); 4-8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer); and 4-8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation).
Id. at 1281.
362. Cramer, 678 So. 2d at 1281.
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In,addition to fair dealing with an attorney's own witnesses or creditors,
an attorney also may owe an obligation of honesty to potential employers.
The Supreme Court of Florida reprimanded an attorney for an intentional
misrepresentation on an employment application in Florida Bar v.
Giant.363 The case stemmed from an earlier disciplinary case 364 in which
Glant, while employed at Central Florida Legal Services, sent a letter to
Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") enclosing an unfiled request for
modifying custody against the wishes of her client, whose husband Glant
thought should be investigated for child abuse. Giant was reprimanded and
placed on probation in that case.365 In the later case, Giant left Central Florida
Legal Services and applied for a position with HRS. In her application and
resume, Giant failed to disclose her prior employment with Central Florida
Legal Services. The application signed by Giant stated that it was "'true,
correct, and made in good faith.' 3 66 Additionally, at her hearing before the
referee "Giant admitted that her failure to disclose her employment with
Central Florida Legal Services was intentional. 367
The court upheld the referee's finding that an attorney "may be
disciplined for an intentional misrepresentation on an application for a
position as a lawyer" in violation of RPC 4-8.4(c) and ordered that she be
publicly reprimanded.3 68 Although it may surprise some that the court would
find a violation for the failure to include information on a job application, it
should be noted that the court emphasized in its opinion Giant's signature as
to the application's veracity, as well as her admission that the omission was
intentional.369
A lawyer, in matters not involving fraud or misrepresentation, may limit
his or her personal liability to third parties. The court found in Porlick,
Poliquin, Samara, Inc. v. Compton370 that firms organized under the
Professional Service Corporation Act may limit the personal liability of their
members in discharging firm debts.371 Compton, a member of the firm,
signed an agreement as president of the firm with a consulting engineer to
investigate and possibly testify as an expert in a case. Porlick and his

363. 684 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1996).
364. Florida Bar v. GIant, 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla.1994). For discussion of this case, see
generally, Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in
Review, 1995, 20 NOVAL. REV. 223, 227 (1995).
365. Giant, 645 So. 2d at 964.

366. Giant, 684 So. 2d at 725.
367. Id.
368. Id.

369. Id.
370. 683 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
371. Id. at 548.
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engineering firm sued Compton in his individual capacity, alleging that
Compton and the firm failed to pay the agreed fee for services performed and
that Compton was individually liable since he signed the contract. The law
372
firm had been organized under the Professional Service Corporation Act
and RPC 4-8.6(a).3 73 The Act provides that shareholders acting in their
capacity as shareholders have no personal liability outside the provision of
legal services. 374 The court concluded that the Act "relieves professional
service corporation shareholders of personal liability for the ordinary business
debts of the professional service corporation." 375 Compton's addition of
"Pres." after his name indicated that he was acting as a shareholder, thus
relieving him of responsibility for the debt.376
However, acting as a shareholder has both benefits and
detriments. Contingent fee contracts signed by a shareholder, even the sole
shareholder of a P.A., inure to the benefit of the P.A. as in the case of In Re
Nelson.377 Nelson, as a member of his P.A., signed a contingent fee contract
as a referring lawyer which provided for a division of fees between his P.A.
and another law firm. 37 8 Prior to the referral, Nelson's P.A. had done

372. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1995).
373. Rule 4-8.6(a) provides in part that: "Lawyers may practice law in the form of
professional service corporations, professional limited liability companies, or registered
limited liability partnerships organized or qualified under applicable law." RPC 4-8.6(a).
374. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1995).
375. Porlick, 683 So. 2d at 548-49.
376. Id. at 546-47.
377. 203 B.R. 756, 761 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
378. See RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D), which states the following:
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within
subdivision (f)(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess
of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the
providing of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for
circuit court authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a
sworn petition signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services
to be performed. The application for authorization of such a contract may be
filed as a separate proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of
a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any
party and this aspect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract
shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or
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significant work on the case. Before the conclusion of the case, Nelson P.A.
and Nelson personally filed for bankruptcy under Chapters 11 and 7. Nelson
was suspended shortly after the petitions were filed, then resigned in lieu of
disciplinary proceedings, and the P.A.'s bankruptcy was converted to a
Chapter 7. Subsequently, the contingent fee case was settled, and a district
court approved the fee division between Nelson P.A. and the 379
other law firm,
which petitioned to determine to whom the fee should be paid.
The court rejected Nelson's argument that he had any personal interest in
the money, concluding that the contract was signed by him in his role as
shareholder in Nelson, P.A.380 The court also indicated that since Nelson was
suspended and then resigned, any fee was based on the value of legal services
performed prior to the suspension, rejecting Nelson's argument that he was
entitled to fees because he performed work on the case after the bankruptcy
was filed and after the suspension.3 81 The court therefore concluded that any
fee was the property of the Nelson P.A. bankruptcy estate and should properly
be paid to the estate. 8 2
Regarding dealings with the IRS, attorneys may not deposit client refund
383 In Ollingerv. Internal Revenue Service,384
checks into their trust account.
charged is clearly excessive. An application under this subdivision shall
contain a certificate showing service on the client and The Florida Bar.
Counsel may proceed with representation of the client pending court

approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for
appellate purposes.
RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D). See also RPC 4-1.5(g), which provides that:
Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g).
379. Nelson, 203 B.R. at 758-60.

380.
381.
382.
383.
1996).

Id. at 762.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Ollinger v. Internal Revenue Serv., 78 A.F.T.R. 2d (R.I.A.) 96-6567 (M.D. Fla.
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an attorney appealed fines assessed against him by the IRS for such
conduct.38 5 With the client's consent, the attorney deposited two refund
checks into his trust account and disbursed the checks to the client and the
attorney. Federal law prohibits negotiation of any refund check to a tax payer
by a preparer of tax documents. 8 6
Finally, an attorney may not assist in the unlicensed practice of
law.38 7 The court found in FloridaBar v. American Senior Citizens Alliance,
Inc.,388 that a corporation owned and managed by nonattorneys for the
purpose of selling legal documents was engaged in the unlicensed practice of
law.38 9 Specifically, the court found that nonlawyer employees gave legal
advice to buyers regarding the appropriateness of estate planning documents
which would be prepared by nonlawyer employees of the corporation then
reviewed by an employee who was an attorney. 390 The nonlawyer determined
which type of estate planning the buyer should use and what documents were
required to fulfill the estate plan, while other nonlawyer employees drafted the
documents. Such conduct went well beyond "gathering [the] necessary
information" 391 required to complete estate documents which the court had
previously found to be permissible.3 92 The referee found that "a lawyer
participating in these same activities would be subject to sanction by The
Florida Bar," citing to RPC 4-5.5.393
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FLORIDA BAR

This section discusses the interaction of attorneys with The Florida Bar,
the disciplinary arm of the Supreme Court of Florida. Some notable
disciplinary cases not discussed in prior sections will be reviewed
here. Additionally, rule changes which are not specific to other sections will
be briefly discussed.

384. Id. at 96-6567.

385. Id.
386. 26 U.S.C. § 6695(f) (1994).
387. RPC 4-5.5(b) provides that: "A lawyer shall not assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law." RPC 4-5.5(b).
388. 689 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1997).
389. Id. at 256.
390. Id. at 257.
391. Id. at 258 (quoting Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of
Living Trusts, 613 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1992)).
392. See generally, Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Living
Trusts, 613 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1992).
393. Id. at 257. See also RPC 4-5.5.
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The area in which the court continues to impose the most severe
discipline is that of false statements. The requirement of honesty is
particularly important in reinstatement proceedings, as evidenced by Florida
Bar v. Orta.394 Orta had been suspended for three years after being convicted
of income tax evasion. Orta applied for reinstatement, but did not disclose the
existence of foreign property when asked to by Florida Bar investigators. The
referee found that Orta did not disclose the property until he was exposed by
Florida Bar investigators and counsel. 395 The pattern of dishonesty while on
suspension for income tax evasion, another form of dishonesty, warranted
disbarment.39 6
Misrepresentation to a foreign disciplinary authority also warrants
disbarment, as demonstrated by Florida Bar v. Budnitz.39 7 Budnitz was
disbarred by New Hampshire after he testified to a grand jury that a document
had been notarized at his office on a particular date when, in fact, it had been
notarized at his home and backdated.3 98 In answering a query from the New
Hampshire Bar, he reiterated that the testimony was true, and was later
disbarred in New Hampshire. 99 The Supreme Court of Florida disbarred
Budnitz as well noting that, although he raised several procedural defects, he
neither denied the conduct or, in the alternative, expressed remorse for it.4" 0
Perhaps because misrepresentation and dishonesty generally warrant the
harshest punishment, the court scrutinizes these cases carefully. The court
confirmed that "[i]n order to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty,
misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud, the Bar must show the necessary element
Similarly, the court refused to
of intent" in Florida Bar v. Lanford.40'
overturn a referee's finding of rehabilitation in an attorney who had checks
returned for insufficient funds in her personal account
402 during the period of her
suspension in Florida Bar v. Hernandez-Yanks. While on suspension for
misappropriation of client funds and trust account violations, HernandezYanks had checks returned for insufficient funds in a joint account with her
husband. The payees were subsequently paid. The referee found that
at the
Hernandez-Yanks lacked knowledge of the balance of her joint account
403
Although
time the checks were written and recommended reinstatement.

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

689 So. 2d 270, 273 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 271-72.
690 So. 2d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 123940.
Id. at 1241.
691 So. 2d 480, 480-81 (Fla. 1997).
690 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 1271.
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the Bar disagreed with the referee, the court refused to "second-guess the
referee. ' 0 4 Perhaps Justice Wells had the better argument in his dissent, in
which he stated that the basis of the suspension in conjunction with the
bounced checks from her personal account indicated "that respondent, within
three months of the referee's report, was continuing the same conduct for
which she was suspended. I cannot excuse the continued writing
°5
V of
overdrafts on the basis that she was unaware of the balance in the account. A
While declining to discipline an attorney for conduct during his judicial
term, 40 6 the court publicly reprimanded an attorney for his behavior during the
conduct of the Judicial Qualifications Committee hearings.40 7 The court
found that Graham repeatedly objected to motions, intentionally delayed the
proceedings, and disregarded the instructions of the presiding chair, as well as
harassed another judge who was called as a witness in deposition. 408 The
court indicated that Graham's actions were mitigated by his prior removal
from the bench, his cooperation in the disciplinary process, and his good
intentions. 40 9 Based on the violations of RPC 4-3.4(e), 410 4-3.5(c), 4F, 43.6(a),412 4-4.4 413 4-8.2(a),414 and 4-8.4(d),4 15 the court reprimanded Graham
as part of a consent judgment.
404. Id. at 1272.
405. Id. at 1273 (Wells, J., dissenting).
406. See Florida Bar v. Graham, 662 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1995) (dismissing several counts
against Graham regarding conduct which resulted in Graham's removal from the bench, but
for which the court declined to discipline Graham).
407. Id. at 1245.

408. Id. at 1243 n.2.
409. Id. at 1244.
410. Rule 4-3.4(e), provides:
A lawyer shall not ...in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying
as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or
innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
411. Rule 4-3.5(c) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt
a tribunal." RPC 4-3.5(c).
412. Rule 4-3.6(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its
creation of an imminent and substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.
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The court also reiterated that it is impermissible to continue the practice
of law while on suspension in Florida Bar v. Rood.4 16 Rood, while on
suspension for two years "failed to notify all his clients of his suspension and.
. . continued to meet with, represent and advise clients, and continued to
receive and disburse client funds from his bank accounts. ' 17 Based on this
evidence, the court disbarred Rood.418
However, the Supreme Court of Florida's direction of the profession is
not limited to discipline; the year saw several amendments to rules of note. In
the arena of lawyer advertising, the court raised the filing fee from $50 to
$100 for advertisements which are required to be filed with and reviewed by
the Standing Committee on Advertising. 419 In the same case, the court
expanded the information which may be provided in advertisements that are
exempt from the filing requirement to include "the office location and parking
arrangements; disability accommodations; electronic mail addresses; a
lawyer's years of experience practicing law; official certification logos for the
fields of law in which a lawyer practices; and common salutary language such

RPC 4-3.6(a).
413. Rule 4-4.4 states that "[i]n representing a client; a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person."
RPC 4-4.4.
414. Rule 4-8.2(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, mediator, arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal
officer, juror or member of the venire, or candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office.
RPC 4-8.2(a).
415. Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from:
[E]ngag[ing] in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis,
including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age,
socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic.
RPC 4-8.4(d).
416. 678 So. 2d 1277, 1277 (Fla. 1996).
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1278.
419. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Rules 4-7.2 & 4-7.5, 690 So.
2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 1997).
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' 2°
as 'best wishes,' 'good luck,' 'happy holidays,' and 'pleased to announce. A
The court also amended the Interest on Trust Accounts ("IOTA") Program
rules to allow voluntary IOTA sweep accounts,4 2' which would allow for
greater interest on the IOTA account.
Finally, the court denied a petition by The Florida Bar which would have
eliminated the pro bono reporting requirement and substituted a voluntary
report. 423 In so doing, the court stated the following:

Lawyers have been granted a special boon by the State of Florida they in effect have a monopoly on the public justice system. In
return, lawyers are ethically bound to help the State's poor gain
access to that system. The mandatory reporting requirement is
essential to guaranteeing that lawyers do their part to provide equal

justice.424
Justices Harding and Wells each dissented in part; although they agreed with
the obligation the majority imposes on lawyers' services to the needy, they
noted the difficulty in enforcement for The Florida Bar.425 Justice Grimes
dissented entirely in the opinion; he approved the "aspirational goals ' '426 of
the rule, but found
mandatory reporting to be "coercion 'A27 and
"counterproductive. 'A28
The Supreme Court of Florida also made significant changes to the rules
on bar admissions in Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating

420. Id. at 1256-57.

421. The court described sweep accounts as follows:
A sweep account is an existing cash management product used to generate
higher yields on checking accounts. At the end of each business day after all
deposits, checks, and charges have cleared against an account, the financial
institution electronically transfers the excess funds out of the account into a
higher yield investment. At the start of the next business day, the financial
institution electronically returns the excess funds to the account and posts the
interest earned.
Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Rule 5-1.1(e)--IOTA, 692 So. 2d 181,
182 n.I (Fla. 1997).
422. Id. at 182.
423. Amendments to Rule 4-6.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Pro Bono
Public Service, 696 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1997).
424. Id. at 735.
425. Id. at 737 (Harding, J., & Wells, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 738 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
427. Id.
428. Amendments to Rule 4-6.1, 696 So. 2d at 738.
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to Admissions to the Bar.429 The changes reorganized and clarified the rules,
and codified some long standing policies of the Board of Bar Examiners. The
court considered comments filed by one Bar member who contested the rules
regarding formal hearings and appeals from the Board, indicating that they
have inadequate due process protections and provide an incomplete record for
the court's review. 43U The court indicated that the Board, in practice, gives
such protections, but recommended that the Board review their rules to
consider codifying their current practices. 431 The member also contested the
requirement of a fee to applicants for whom the Board requires a formal
hearing who are ultimately admitted to the Bar. The court adopted the rule
change requiring the fee of all applicants who undergo a formal hearing,
noting that the hearing was required whether the applicant was admitted or
not and that the costs associated with the hearings are fairly placed on those
whose applications required a greater expenditure of the Board's resources.432
VI. CONCLUSION

Cases, rules, and ethics opinions continue to define the role of lawyers in
dealings with their clients, the justice system, and society as a whole. Interest
in the area of professional responsibility has continued to expand in 1997.
Lawyers have become more concerned with the image of the profession, and
believe that ethics and professionalism must be focussed on to improve it.
This article has examined a wide spectrum of topics within ethics and
professionalism, of which lawyers should remain aware to practice
responsibly and attain the high standards imposed on them.

429.
430.
431.
432.

695 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at314.

